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1955] RECENT DECISIONS 133 
EVIDENCE-SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS-STATEMENT BY INJURED PARTY 
WmLE ON WAY TO HOSPITAL-Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile 
accident involving a car, driven by the defendant's decedent, and two on-
coming trucks, one passing the other on a three lane highway. Twenty-five 
minutes after the accident a state police officer arrived and took the driver 
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of the passing truck, who was severely burned and in terrific pain, to the 
hospital. En route and in response to the officer's inquiry, the driver stated 
that defendant had caused the accident by swerving to the wrong side of 
the road. The statement was admitted over defendant's objection that it 
was hearsay, and verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, 
reversed. The statement was hearsay and not within the spontaneous 
declarations exception because the circumstances were not such as to pre-
clude premeditation and consideration. W eshalek v. W eshalek, 379 Pa. 
544, 109 A. (2d) 302 (1954). 
The admission of spontaneous declarations1 as an exception to the 
hearsay rule is based on the necessity or desirability of resorting to them 
for unbiased testimony2 and their probable trustworthiness because of 
the circumstances under which they are made.3 Generally, to invoke the 
exception the utterance (a) must be made during or following an event 
either startling or at least distracting in its effect, (b) if made after the 
event, must be made sufficiently soon to allow the assumption of spon-
taneity, and (c) must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.4 The 
character of the event necessary is variously described. One view is that 
it must be "startling enough to produce . . . nervous excitement and 
render the utterance spontaneous and unreflective."5 However, many de-
cisions do not support such a limitation, but merely require that the state-
ment be made while declarant was perceiving the occurrence, or soon 
thereafter, and that "because of the resultant mental distraction there is 
reasonable assurance that the utterance is unreflective."6 The principal 
case meets either of these tests. The more important concern is the time 
element. The conservative view is that the statement must be contem-
1 The expression "spontaneous declarations" is used rather than "res gestae" because 
the latter "is a phrase that has been accountable for so much confusion that it had best 
be denied any place whatever in legal terminology." United States v. Matot, (2d Cir. 
1944) 146 F. (2d) 197 at 198. For a clear statement of the distinction between spontaneous 
declarations and verbal acts, see Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P. (2d) 425 (1937). 
2 6 WrcMoRE, EVIDENCE §1748 (1940). But death, absence or other unavailability 
of the witness need not be shown. State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873). See 14 UNIV. 
DETROIT L. J. 152 (1951). . 
3 Ladi:l, "The Hearsay We Admit," 5 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 271 at 281 (1952). The Georgia 
statute admits "Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly · connected therewith in 
time as to be free from all suspicion of device or after thought .... " Ga. Code Ann. 
(1933) §38-305. 
4 In 32 CORN. L. Q. ll5 (1946), the writer suggests that there are five factors to 
consider, namely, (a) time, (b) place, (c) whether made in response to an inquiry, 
(d) form of the statement, and (e) physical condition of the declarant. The first three, 
however, are related to the time when the statement was made, the latter two to the 
character of the event as it affects the declarant. See also IO BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 280 (1941). 
5 6 WrcMoRE, EVIDENCE §1750 (1940). As to what constitutes a startling occurrence 
or condition and whether the declarant must be a participant in it, see Hardman, 
"Spontaneous Declarations (Res Gestae),'' 54 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 93 (1952); Harris v. Hughes, 
(Mo. App. 1954) 266 S.W. (2d) 763. Cf. Huffman v. Gaylor, (Okla. 1954) 267 P. (2d) 564. 
6 See 46 CoL. L. R.Ev. 430 (1946). In Huffman v. Gaylor, note 5 supra, the motor 
fell out of plaintiff's car and defendant's statement as to the cause was admitted as a 
spontaneous declaration. It has been suggested that the factor of pain alone is sufficient 
basis for considering the declarant's statements unreflective. 37 J. CRIM. L. 419 (1947). 
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poraneous with the event which produces it;7 this is nothing more than 
the Thayer view of res gestae. Although this view still has support,8 the 
general trend is toward admitting statements made after the event but 
while declarant's mind is still occupied with the circumstances.9 This 
broader view requires only that the time lapse between the event and the 
declaration be insufficient to permit operation of the motive to falsify.10 
But calculation of time alone provides few answers. The problem under 
this rule is to determine under what facts lapse of time in conjunction 
with other factors destroys spontaneity. Thus, exclamatory statements are 
readily admitted.11 While courts scrutinize the circumstances more closely 
in the case of narrative declarations, they also are admitted.12 More im-
portant than the character of the statement is the factor of change of 
locale, a factor present in the principal case. Usually a declaration made 
after removal from the scene of the event, e.g., at a hospital or on way to 
a hospital, is inadmissible,18 but there are cases where change of scene has 
not been fatal to the required spontaneity.14 While instigation of the 
7 There is authority for admitting a statement made before the event as a spon-
taneous declaration. Hodge Drive It Yourself, Inc. v. Cincinnati Gas &: Electric Co., 
90 Ohio App. 77, 96 N.E. (2d) 325 (1950). 
8 Waldele v. New York C. &: H. R. Co., 95 N.Y. 274 I (1884); Goulette v. Grand 
Trunk R. Co., 93 Vt. 266, 107 A. 118 (1919); Ingersol v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 
N.Y. 1, 14 N.E. (2d) 828 (1938). 
9 Compare Southern Ry. Co. v. Fricks, 196 Ala. 61, 71 S. 701 (1916) (exclamatory 
but not immediate, excluded), with Shipp v. Davis, 25 Ala. App. 104, 141 S. 366 (1932) 
(not immediate, admitted); Williams v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 133 Cal. 550 at 555, 
65 P. 1100 (1901) ("if afterward, no matter how shortly, it is incompetent''), with Sho-
walter v. Western P.R. Co., 16 Cal. (2d) 460, 106 P. (2d) 895 (1940); and Blackman v. 
West Jersey and S.R. Co., 68 N.J.L. 1, 52 A. 370 (1902), with State v. Stephan, 118 
N.J.L. 592, 194 A. 273 (1937) . 
. 10 Ladd, "The Hearsay We Admit," 5 OKLA. L. REv. 271 at 281 (1952). Sand 
Springs Ry. v. Piggee, 196 Okla. 136, 163 P. (2d) 545 (1945); Showalter v. Western 
P.R. Co., note 9 supra. Under this rule the time lapse may be several hours without 
destroying the spontaneous character of the declaration. State v. Buck, 33 N.M. 334, 
266 P. 917 (1927) (4 hours); State v. Stafford, 237 Iowa 780, 23 N.W. (2d) 832 (1946) 
(14 hours). 
11 Louisville E. &: St. L.C.R. Co. v. Berry, 2 Ind. App. 427, 28 N.E. 714 (1891) 
(declarant scalded); Roh v. Opocensky, 126 Neb. 518, 253 N.W. 680 (1934) (declarant in 
automobile accident). 
12 Self-serving narrative declarations admitted: Chesapeake &: 0. Ry. Co. v. Mears, 
(4th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 291; Fish v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 96 Iowa 702, 65 N.W. 995 
(1896). Self-i~culpatory narrative declarations admitted: Roach v. Kansas City Public 
Service Ice Co., (Mo. 1940) 141 S.W. (2d) 800 (statement not admissible as admission 
because declarant was not a party). On the use of the spontaneous declaration rule to 
admit self-inculpatory statements by defendant's servants who are available, see 163 
A.L.R. 101-122 (1946). 
13 Stanford v. Holloway, 25 Tenn. App. 379, 157 S.W. (2d) 864 (1942) (on way 
to hospital); Bonner v. Texas Co., (5th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 291 (in hospital); Wash-
ington &: G.R. Co. v. McLane, 11 App. D.C. 220 (1897) (on way to hospital with legs 
cut off). But see Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 253 P. (2d) 240 (1953) (declarant 
unconscious on way to hospital, statement made in hospital admitted); 163 A.L.R. 
148-162 (1946). 
14Soderstrom v. Missouri P.R. Co., (Mo. App. 1940) 141 S.W. (2d) 73 (on way to 
hospital); Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Williams, 36 Ariz. 520, 287 P. 440 (1930) (on way to 
hospital); Stukas v. Warfield-Pratt-Howell Co., 188 Iowa 878, 175 N.W. 81 (1920) (in 
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declaration by an inquiry, as in the principal case, makes it narrative in 
form, this does not affect its admissibility.15 There are also intangible 
factors which may persuade courts to admit noncontemporaneous state-
ments, factors such as death of the declarant16 or the nature of the action.17 
The third requirement, that the declaration relate to the preceding 
circumstances, "is a cautionary rather than logically necessary restriction."18 
The court in the principal case, though purporting to follow a liberal 
approach, found that spontaneity was lost because of the time lapse and 
change of scene. In Suhr v. LindelP.9 the Nebraska court reached an 
opposite conclusion on very similar facts. The latter decision is preferable 
for three reasons. First, extreme pain alone should be enough to give 
credence to the statements.20 Second, in view of the desirability of marsh-
alling all relevant evidence, the trial court's determination to admit the 
declaration, even if not conclusive, should be given great weight.21 Lastly, 
the court in the principal case in effect requires that the circumstances 
eliminate all possibility of falsehood22 rather than all probability of false-
hood, the test usually applied.23 
James Beatty, S.Ed. 
hospital); Roach v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 257, 158 N.W. 232 (1916) (in 
hospital) . 
.W Greenlee v. Kansas City Casualty Co., 192 Mo. 303, 182 S.W. 138 (1916); Sho-
walter v. Western P.R. Co., note 9 supra; Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A. 
(2d) 760 (1952). Contra: under the conservative rule: Greener v. General Electric Co., 
209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913); Hunter v. Derby Foods, (2d Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 970. 
16 Stukas v. Warfield-Pratt-Howell Co., note 14 supra. 
p.7 Jacobs v. Village of Buhl, 199 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937) (workmen's com-
pensation case: 45 minutes elapsed, declaration admitted). 
18 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1750 (1940). That the declaration need not relate to the 
main event, see State v. McKinney, 88 W. Va. 400, 106 S.E. 894 (1921). 
1 9 133 Neb. 856, 277 N.W. 381 (1938) (statement by fatally injured truck driver, 
in response to inquiry made by physician thirty minutes after accident, that defendant 
was on wrong side of road). 
120 37 J. CRIM. L. 419 (1947). 
121 That the determination of spontaneity should be left to the trial court's discre-
tion, see Huffman v. Gaylor, note 5 supra; Davis v. Fay, 265 Wis. 426, 61 N.W. (2d) 
885 (1954). 
22 This is the criticism made by Justice Musmanno in his dissent. Principal case at 304. 
23 "The exceptions, at most, rest upon circumstantial probability, not a certainty," 
and "the idea back of the exceptions is that conditions were such that the witness 
would probably speak the truth as he knew it." Ladd, "The Hearsay We Admit," 5 
OKLA. L. REv. 271 at 281, 286 (1952) (emphasis added). 
